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Abstract
International industry data permits testing whether the industry-speci￿c impact of cross-country
di⁄erences in institutions or policies is consistent with economic theory. Empirical implementation
requires specifying the industry characteristics that determine impact strength. Most of the lit-
erature has been using US proxies of the relevant industry characteristics. We show that using
industry characteristics in a benchmark country as a proxy of the relevant industry characteristics
can result in an attenuation bias or an ampli￿cation bias. We also describe circumstances allowing
for an alternative approach that yields consistent estimates. As an application, we reexamine the
in￿ uential conjecture that ￿nancial development facilitates the reallocation of capital from declining
to expanding industries.
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Applied economists have started using industry data to examine the economic e⁄ects of
cross-country di⁄erences in ￿nancial development, institutional quality, and other potential
determinants of aggregate economic activity. Their motivation is that theory predicts the
impact of, say, ￿nancial underdevelopment or malfunctioning institutions to be stronger
in some industries than others. The two principal advantages of the cross-industry cross-
country approach are its focus on theoretical mechanisms and that it is straightforward to
control for country-level determinants of economic activity (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). So
far, the approach has been applied to a variety of issues in ￿nance (e.g. Rajan and Zingales,
1998; Braun and Larrain, 2005; Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006; Aghion et al., 2007; Fisman and
Love, 2007; Beck et al., 2008; Manova, 2008); to examine how property rights institutions
a⁄ect economic development (e.g. Claessens and Laeven, 2003; Levchenko, 2007; Nunn,
2007); to study the link between human capital and comparative advantage (e.g. Romalis,
2004; Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2009); to investigate the e⁄ect of labor market institutions
on comparative advantage and productivity (e.g. Cingano et al., 2010; Cuæat and Melitz,
2010); and to examine the economic consequences of ￿rm size, entry regulation, transaction
costs, ￿scal policy, risk sharing, and foreign aid (e.g. Pagano and Schivardi, 2003; Klapper et
al., 2006; Acemoglu et al., 2009; Aghion et al. 2010; Michelacci and Schivardi, 2010; Rajan
and Subramanian, 2010).
Implementation of the cross-industry cross-country approach requires specifying which
industries should be a⁄ected most by ￿nancial underdevelopment, malfunctioning institu-
tions, labor market rigidities, high entry costs, etc. For example, Fisman and Love (2007)
argue that ￿nancial underdevelopment lowers growth most in industries with the potential
to expand, while Nunn (2007) reasons that better property rights protection favors indus-
tries that require relationship-speci￿c intermediate inputs. Obtaining the relevant industry
characteristics is di¢ cult because of limited international industry data and also because, in
principle, the cross-industry cross-country approach requires measures of these characteris-
tics if the economy was undistorted. In practice, following Rajan and Zingales (1998), most
of the literature has been using US industry characteristics as a proxy because there are rich
industry data and distortions tend to be low compared to other developed economies.
Although applied widely, the properties of the cross-industry cross-country estimator
have not been studied yet. We show that using industry characteristics in a benchmark
country as a proxy for the relevant industry characteristics introduces a bias shaped by two
countervailing forces. Using a proxy introduces measurement error which, unsurprisingly, can
1result in attenuation bias (a bias towards zero). But the measurement error introduced by
benchmarking industry characteristics can also result in ampli￿cation bias, because industry
characteristics in the benchmark country may be a better proxy for industry characteristics
in similar countries. As an example, consider Fisman and Love￿ s (2007) conclusion that
￿nancial underdevelopment slows down resource reallocation to industries with high growth
potential. This conclusion is based on their empirical ￿nding that US-based measures of
industry growth potential are more closely related to actual industry growth in ￿nancially
developed countries than in ￿nancially underdeveloped countries. Our econometric analysis
highlights that this ￿nding does not imply an e⁄ect of ￿nancial development on growth.
Instead it could be the result of US-based measures of growth potential being a better proxy
for growth potential in ￿nancially developed countries.
After characterizing the bias of the cross-industry cross-country estimator, we describe
circumstances allowing for an alternative approach that yields consistent estimates. As an
application, we examine the conjecture that ￿nancial development facilitates the reallocation
of capital from declining industries to industries with good investment opportunities (e.g.
Bagehot, 1873; Schumpeter, 1911; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Fisman and Love, 2007; for a
review see Levine, 2005). We embed the capital reallocation hypothesis in a multi-industry
world equilibrium model with country-speci￿c and global demand and supply shifts and
develop its testable implications. Our empirical work indicates a signi￿cant link between
￿nancial development and capital reallocation towards industries with better investment
opportunities.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains our econometric
analysis of cross-industry cross-country models. Section 2.1 sets up the general econometric
framework. Section 2.2 derives the benchmarking bias of the standard cross-industry cross-
country estimator. Section 2.3 describes an alternative estimator. Section 3 discusses an
application of our empirical framework and estimation approach. Section 3.1 presents a
theoretical model of ￿nancial development and inter-industry resource reallocation. Section
3.2 explains how the link can be tested empirically. Section 4 contains our empirical results.
Section 5 summarizes.
2 Empirical Cross-Industry Cross-Country Models
We present an empirical framework that encompasses the cross-industry cross-country liter-
ature (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Romalis, 2004; Fisman and Love, 2007; Nunn, 2007).
This framework allows us to discuss the biases that arise when the industry characteristics
2of one country, the benchmark country, are used to proxy industry characteristics in other
countries. Our key result is that such benchmarking of industry characteristics may result
in attenuation bias or ampli￿cation bias. We detail the source of ampli￿cation bias and
illustrate it in a simple example and with a Monte Carlo simulation. We also explain under
what circumstances the benchmarking bias can be avoided.
2.1 Empirical Framework
Suppose the theoretical model yields
(1) ysn = ￿n + ￿s + ￿zsnxn + vsn;
where s = f1;::;Sg are industries and n = f1;::;Ng countries.1 For example, following Rajan
and Zingales (1998), ysn could be value-added growth of industries in di⁄erent countries; zsn
the external-￿nance dependence of these industries; xn the degree of ￿nancial development of
countries; ￿n and ￿s country- and industry-level growth determinants; and vsn unobservable
growth determinants at the country-industry level. The parameter of interest in (1) is the
coe¢ cient ￿ on the interaction term. If ￿ > 0; ￿nancial development raises growth more
in ￿nance-dependent industries. A closely related example is Fisman and Love (2007), who
focus on the interaction between ￿nancial development and growth opportunities available
in each industry. A third example ￿tting the empirical framework in (1) is Nunn (2007),
where ysn refers to country-industry exports; zsn to the extent intermediate inputs used by
the industries are relationship speci￿c; and xn to the quality of contract enforcement. In
this example, the interaction term allows for contract enforcement to raise exports more in
industries with relationship-speci￿c inputs.
Usually there are no data on zsn for a broad set of countries. This raises the question
whether ￿ can be estimated using the industry characteristics of a benchmark country as
a proxy. Such benchmarking of industry characteristics can only work if there are some
industry characteristics that are common across countries (global). In the context of Rajan
and Zingales (1998) and Nunn (2007) these would be technological characteristics that tend
to make one industry more ￿nance dependent or more relationship speci￿c than another. In
Fisman and Love, the global industry characteristic refers to industry growth opportunities
that are available in all countries.
To capture the idea of a global industry characteristic we assume that there is an industry
characteristic zs that is common to an industry no matter where it is located. It seems
1Alternatively, s could refer to ￿rms and n to regions for example. We use industries and countries
because currently most applications are at the country-industry level.
3unreasonable to suppose that all industry characteristics are global and we therefore allow
for a country-industry speci￿c element "sn,
(2) zsn = zs + "sn;
where "sn has the following main features.2 First, "sn is independent of zs. Second, E("snjn) =
E("snjs) = 0. Third, to capture that industry characteristics zsn may re￿ ect global industry
characteristics more closely in some countries than others, we allow for ￿2
k = E("2
snjn = k) 6=
E("2
snjn = l) = ￿2
k for k 6= l. Fourth, to capture that some country pairs may have more
similar industry characteristics than others, we allow for ￿kl = E("sn"smjn = k;m = l) 6=
E("sn"smjn = p;m = q) = ￿pq for k 6= l 6= p 6= q. These features can be captured by a model
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where I is an identity matrix of size S.
For the empirical framework to be su¢ ciently general to encompass the cross-industry
cross-country literature, we allow vsn in (1) to be related to "sn in (2),
(4) vsn = ￿"sn + ￿sn;
where ￿sn is i.i.d. across countries and industries and E(￿snjn) = E(￿snjs) = 0. To see
the case for ￿ 6= 0 in an example, consider Fisman and Love￿ s (2007) study. They argue
that industries with favorable growth opportunities should see faster value-added growth in
￿nancially developed countries because well-working ￿nancial markets reallocate production
factors more rapidly. The corresponding empirical framework would be ysn = ￿n + ￿s +
￿zsnxn + vsn, where ysn is value-added growth, zsn the growth opportunity of industry s in
country n, and xn the degree of ￿nancial development in country n. Assuming ￿ = 0 would
be equivalent to supposing that growth opportunities a⁄ect actual growth only through the
interaction with ￿nancial development. But industries may be able to adjust production
along margins that do not require ￿nancial markets, by relying on internal cash-￿ ow or
2Allowing for a country-speci￿c element, i.e. zsn = zn+zs +"sn, would not a⁄ect our results as zn would
end up being absorbed by the country ￿xed e⁄ect in (1). We therefore assume zn = 0 for simplicity.
4trade credit for example (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Fisman and Love, 2003). ￿ 6= 0
allows for such alternative margins of adjustment. Another reason to allow for ￿ 6= 0 is
that industry growth opportunities may arise because of demand shocks, which would a⁄ect
prices and hence value-added growth even if industries were unable to adjust any factor of
production.
An immediate implication of the empirical framework is that it would be straightforward
to estimate ￿ if we were to observe the global industry characteristic zs. Substituting (2)
and (4) in (1) yields
(5) ysn = ￿n + ￿s + ￿zsxn + !sn;
where !sn = ￿"snxn + ￿"sn + ￿sn. Because E(zsxn!sn) = 0, ￿ could be estimated consis-
tently by regressing ysn on country ￿xed e⁄ects, industry ￿xed e⁄ects, and the interaction
between country characteristics and global industry characteristics zsxn using least squares
(the calculation of standard errors would have to take into account that !sn is non-spherical).
But global industry characteristics are unobservable in practice. The cross-industry cross-
country literature proceeds by using a proxy from a benchmark country, usually the US
(zsUS). The equation being estimated is
(6) ysn = ￿n + ￿s + ￿zsUSxn + residualsn;
with US data being used solely to obtain zsUS. We now address two questions about this
estimating equation. What is the benchmarking bias when (6) is estimated using least
squares, and under what circumstances can the bias be avoided?
2.2 Benchmarking Bias
It is immediate to see that least-squares estimation of (6) will in general not yield a consistent
estimate of ￿. (1), (2), and (4) imply that the residual in (6) is given by
(7) residualsn = ￿("sn ￿ "sUS)xn + ￿"sn + ￿sn:
Moreover, (2) implies that the interaction term on the right-hand side of (6) is zsUSxn =
zsxn + "sUSxn. Hence, the regressor of interest in (6) will in general be correlated with the
residual.
To determine the least-squares bias, it is useful to write the least-squares estimator (b ￿)
5in terms of demeaned data,3
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s ysn. Substituting for ysn using (6) and (7), and taking the


























denotes the probability limit of b ￿: To obtain (9) we made use of E("snjn) =
E("snjs) = E(￿snjn) = E(￿snjs) = 0. To simplify the expression in the denominator we also
assumed Ezs = 0.4
The sign of the least-squares bias is determined by the probability limit in (9). If this





















where the ￿-terms are de￿ned in (3). To go from (9) to (10), it is useful to de￿ne ￿sn =











n(xn ￿ x)(￿xn(￿nUS ￿ ￿2
US) + ￿￿nUS) and ￿ = limN!1 ￿N. We want to show
that ￿ is the probability limit of ￿ as N and S go to in￿nity. To do so we need to show
that for all ￿ > 0 and ￿ > 0 there is a N0;S0 such that for N ￿ N0;S ￿ S0 it is true that
Prob(￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿) ￿ 1 ￿ ￿. The ￿rst step involves application of the law of large








n ￿sn. It can be checked using
(3) that ￿N
s ; s = 1;:::;S satis￿es that E(￿N
s ￿N
j ) = 0 for s 6= j, that E(￿N
s ￿N
s ) is the same
for all s, and that E￿N
s = ￿N. Hence, by the law of large numbers, for every N there is
3In panel econometrics, this is known as the within transformation (e.g. Baltagi, 2008, Chapter 3).
4Allowing for Ezs 6= 0 complicates the expression in the denominator without generating any interesting
insights as the sign of the bias is determined by the numerator.
6an b SN such that for S ￿ b SN it is true that Prob(￿N ￿ ￿=2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿N + ￿=2) ￿ 1 ￿ ￿: The
second step is to show that this implies that there is a N0;S0 such that for N ￿ N0;S ￿ S0
it is true that Prob(￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿) ￿ 1 ￿ ￿: First note that because ￿ = limN!1 ￿N,
there is a b N such that for N ￿ b N we get that ￿ ￿ ￿=2 ￿ ￿N ￿ ￿ + ￿=2. The ￿rst part
of this inequality implies ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿N ￿ ￿=2 and the second part of the inequality implies
￿N + ￿=2 ￿ ￿ + ￿: Hence, there is a b N such that for N ￿ b N; ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿N ￿ ￿=2 ￿ ￿N + ￿=2
￿ ￿ +￿ or equivalently [￿N ￿￿=2;￿N +￿=2] v[￿ ￿￿;￿ +￿]. This implies that Prob(￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿) ￿ Prob(￿N ￿ ￿=2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿N + ￿=2) ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ for all N ￿ b N and S ￿ S
b N, which is
what we needed to show.
2.2.1 Benchmarking: Attenuation versus Ampli￿cation Bias
A useful starting point for understanding the implications of (10) is the special case where
"sUS = 0 for all industries, which implies that ￿2
US = E"2
sUS = 0. In this case, US industry
characteristics are equal to global industry characteristics, zsUS = zs for all s. As a result,
least-squares estimation of (6) is equivalent to least-squares estimation of (5). As ￿ in (5)
can be estimated consistently using least squares, the least-squares estimate of ￿ in (6) must
also be consistent. To see that this is an implication of (10) note that "sUS = 0 for all s
implies ￿nUS = 0 and that substituting ￿2
US = ￿nUS = 0 in (10) yields b ￿
a
= ￿.
Attenuation Bias Another interesting special case is when US industry characteristics
di⁄er from global industry characteristics but the discrepancy re￿ ects US idiosyncrasies
only. Formally, this corresponds to ￿2
US 6= 0 and ￿nUS = 0. In this case, (10) simpli￿es
to b ￿
a
= ￿ ￿ ￿￿2
US=Ez2
sUS. Hence, least-squares estimates are attenuated, jb ￿
a
j < j￿j for all
￿ 6= 0. The intuition is that of the classical measurement error model.
But discrepancies between US and global industry characteristics can also result in an
ampli￿cation bias, jb ￿
a


















. Hence, there will be attenuation
bias if ￿ < ￿2
US and ampli￿cation bias if ￿ > ￿2
US. (There is also a knife-edge case ￿ = ￿2
US
when the two countervailing forces shaping the bias o⁄set exactly.)
We now investigate the source of ampli￿cation bias and give an example where (11) takes
an especially simple form.
7Ampli￿cation Bias To develop a better understanding of (11), and the condition for
ampli￿cation bias ￿ > ￿2
US, we simplify the model in (1) to5
(12) ysn = ￿xnzsn
and consider an alternative, two-step derivation of (11):
(i) Cross-Industry Analysis: For each country n obtain the least-squares e⁄ect of
zsn on ysn using US industry characteristics zsUS as a proxy for zsn. This yields the following
N country-speci￿c least-squares estimates







= ￿xn + ￿’n n = 1;:::;N;
where ￿xn is the true e⁄ect in country n, see (12), and ￿’n = ￿xn(￿nUS ￿ ￿2
US)=Ez2
sUS the
country-speci￿c bias due to using US industry characteristics as a proxy. Hence, the country-
speci￿c bias depends on ￿nUS; the covariance between unobserved industry characteristics
in country n and the US.
(ii) Cross-Country Analysis: Obtain the least-squares e⁄ect of xn on the country-
speci￿c estimates in (13). It is straightforward to check that this yields the right-hand side
of (11).
This alternative derivation brings out that the bias b ￿
a
￿ ￿ = ￿(￿ ￿ ￿2
US)=Ez2
sUS in (11)
can be understood in terms of how the country-speci￿c benchmarking bias ￿’n in (13) varies
with the country characteristic xn. Consider the example where ￿ > 0 and xn > 0; which
implies that ￿xn in (12) is strictly positive for all countries. Suppose also that ￿nUS < ￿2
US.
In this case, (13) implies that benchmarking yields least-squares estimates of the country-
speci￿c slopes ￿xn that are biased downwards for all countries (￿’n < 0). Still, if the
country-speci￿c downward bias ￿’n becomes smaller in absolute value as xn increases, the
least-squares estimate of ￿ will be biased upwards. Figure 1 illustrates this scenario when xn
takes two values only, xn 2 fxl;xhg.
Ampli￿cation and Attenuation Bias in a Simple Example An interesting special
case where (11) takes a particularly simple form is the following. Suppose that the country-
level variable xn can take two values only, xn 2 fxl;xhg with xl < xh. Suppose also that
5The ￿rst simpli￿cation is that we drop the industry and country ￿xed e⁄ects. This does not involve any
loss of generality, but simpli￿es the notation. The second simpli￿cation is that we assume that vsn = 0:
8there are L countries with low x and H countries plus the US (the benchmark country) with
high x.
Industry characteristics zsn continue to be given by zsn = zs +"sn in (2). But we assume
a distribution of "sn that is a special case of (3). For the L countries in the xl-group,
"sn is generated by L ￿ S independent draws from a N(0;1) distribution. For the US and
the other H countries in the xh-group, "sn is generated by S independent random vectors













































where I is an identity matrix of size H and ￿1 < ￿ < 1. Hence, if ￿ > 0, there is a positive
correlation between US industry characteristics and industry characteristics in other xH-
countries (while there is no correlation between US industry characteristics and industry
characteristics in xL-countries).
In this example, (11) takes a particularly simple form6
(15) b ￿
a
= ￿ + ￿




Benchmarking therefore yields an attenuation bias if xl < (1 ￿ ￿)xh and an ampli￿cation
bias if xl > (1 ￿ ￿)xh. For example, if xh > 0; there will be an ampli￿cation bias when
the correlation between US industry characteristics and industry characteristics in other
xH-countries is strictly greater than 1 ￿ xl=xh:
The example lends itself to a Monte Carlo simulation. Suppose there are 30 industries,
50 countries in the xl-group, and 25 countries plus the benchmark country in the xh-group.7
Suppose also that ￿ = 0:5; that xl = 190 and xh = 200, and that zs takes a uniform
distribution on [-3,+3]. Once a value for ￿ in (14) has been speci￿ed, this model can be
used to generate data for ysn and zsUS by drawing "sn for each country and industry. The
generated data can then be used to obtain a least-squares estimate of ￿ by regressing ysn















= H(xh ￿ x)xh￿=
￿
H(xh ￿ x)2 + L(xl ￿ x)2￿
. Substituting for x
yields xh￿=(xh ￿ xl) and hence that ￿ = xh￿=(xh ￿ xl). Substituting in (11) yields (15).
7This re￿ ects roughly the number of industries and countries in studies using industry value added data
(e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Fisman and Love, 2007).
9on xnzsUS where n refers to all countries except the benchmark country.8 We repeat the
process of drawing "sn for each country and industry 1000 times, which yields 1000 di⁄erent
datasets and 1000 di⁄erent least-squares estimates. Figure 2 plots the average least-squares
estimate (dashed red line) and the least-squares estimate implied by the asymptotic least-
squares formula in (15) (solid blue line) for di⁄erent values of ￿. It can be seen that the
benchmarking approach goes from underestimating the true value ￿ = 0:5 for small positive
values of ￿ to overestimating it for larger values of ￿.9 The ￿gure also illustrates that the
formula in (15) predicts the Monte Carlo result quite well.
2.2.2 Additional Sources of Benchmarking Bias
When ￿ 6= 0 in (4), there is a correlation between (unobservable) country-industry factors
a⁄ecting industry outcomes directly, which are captured by vsn in (1), and country-industry
factors a⁄ecting industry outcomes through the interaction, which are captured by "sn in (2).
This gives rise to an additional source of benchmarking bias that is likely to be relevant in
practice. To see this in the simplest possible case, suppose that ￿ = 0: In this case (10) can
be written as b ￿
a
= ￿￿=Ez2
sUS where ￿ = limN!1
￿X





least-squares slope when regressing ￿nUS on xn. Hence, even though ￿ = 0; benchmarking
industry characteristics will lead to a strictly positive b ￿
a
if ￿ and ￿ have the same sign and
a strictly negative b ￿
a
if ￿ and ￿ have the opposite sign. The standard cross-industry cross-
country approach can therefore result in a signi￿cant interaction e⁄ect although in fact there
is no interaction between country and industry characteristics. Intuitively, the bias arises
because US industry characteristics are more closely related to the industry characteristics
of some countries than others and industry characteristics and industry outcomes are jointly
determined.
2.3 Avoiding the Benchmarking Bias
In some circumstances it is possible to avoid the benchmarking bias and obtain a consistent
estimate of ￿. To see when this is case, suppose we observed an industry characteristic
￿s that is proportional to the global industry characteristic zs, ￿s = ￿zs. This allows
estimating (6) using an instrumental-variables (2SLS) approach with ￿sxn as an instrument
for zsUSxn. The resulting estimate of ￿ would be consistent because ￿s is correlated with
zsUS (both re￿ ect the global industry characteristic) but uncorrelated with the residual of the
8The cross-industry cross-country literature always excludes the benchmark country from the regression
analysis. We follow this convention although it makes no di⁄erence in practice.
9To ensure that the variance-covariance matrix in (14) is positive semi-de￿nite, ￿ cannot exceed a value
that depends on H. This is the reason why the largest ￿ in Figure 2 is well below 1.
10estimating equation detailed in (7). As is well understood, such an instrumental-variables
approach would continue to yield consistent estimates if instead of ￿s we used a consistent
estimator b ￿s, see Wooldridge (2002), Section 6.1.2 for example. To see that obtaining such
a consistent estimator is feasible in some circumstances, note that (5) can be rewritten as
ysn = ￿n+￿s+￿sxn+!sn and that the industry-speci￿c slopes ￿s = ￿zs are proportional to zs
as long as ￿ 6= 0. Moreover, the industry-speci￿c slopes in (5) can be estimated consistently









n !sn = 0; ￿ can be estimated consistently using a two-step approach. First,
obtain least-squares estimates b ￿s of the industry-speci￿c slopes in (5). If these slopes are
jointly signi￿cant, apply 2SLS to (6) using b ￿sxn as an instrument for zsUSxn.11
The two-step instrumental-variables approach can be applied to the Monte Carlo data
we generated at the end of Section 2.2.1. The ￿rst step involves using one of the generated
datasets to obtain least-squares estimates b ￿s of the industry-speci￿c slopes in ysn = ￿sxn +
!sn. The second step involves obtaining a 2SLS estimate of ￿ by estimating ysn = ￿zsUSxn+
residualsn using b ￿sxn as an instrument for zsUSxn. Repeating this for each of the 1000
generated datasets yields 1000 2SLS estimates of ￿. Figure 3 plots the average of these
estimates (solid blue line) for di⁄erent values of ￿. It can be seen that the average 2SLS
estimate stays much closer to the true value of ￿=0:5 than the average estimate obtained
using the benchmarking approach (dashed red line).
3 The Capital Reallocation Hypothesis: From Theory
to Empirical Testing
According to an in￿ uential conjecture, higher levels of ￿nancial development lead to capital
being reallocated more rapidly from declining industries to industries with good investment
opportunities (e.g. Bagehot, 1873; Schumpeter, 1911; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Levine
1997 and 2005; Fisman and Love, 2007). To develop the implications of this conjecture for
industry growth, we embed it in a multi-industry world equilibrium model with country-
speci￿c and global demand and supply shifts. We also discuss under which conditions the
capital reallocation hypothesis can be tested with the available industry data.
10A su¢ cient condition for this assumption to be satis￿ed in our empirical framework is that xn is bounded
above and below.
11Rejection of the hypothesis that the slopes in (5) are zero implies rejection of the hypothesis ￿ = 0.
113.1 Theoretical Framework
The world consists of a continuum of open economies inhabited by households with love-for-
variety preferences for goods in a continuum of industries. Firms take goods prices as given
and prices adjust to clear goods markets. In economies with perfect ￿nancial markets, the
allocation of capital equalizes rates of return across industries. In ￿nancially underdeveloped
economies, there are frictions that slow down the reallocation of capital towards sectors with
high returns to capital.
Preferences, Demand, and Technology The continuum of open economies has mass N
and the continuum of industries has mass S. Each industry consists of varieties di⁄erentiated











with ￿ < 1, where csnt is consumption of the country-n variety in industry s in period t and
Bsnt is a preference shifter. These preferences imply that households spend a constant share
of income in each industry and that the elasticity of substitution between varieties in the
same industry is 1=(1 ￿ ￿).




0 psntcsntdsdn ￿ mht, where mht denotes expenditures of household h in period t and
psnt is the price of the country-n variety in industry s. The implied demand function for
each variety is












is the price index for industry s and Mst real
world expenditures in industry s. Hence, demand for the country-n variety in industry s is
increasing in the preference shifter and world expenditures in industry s, and decreasing in
its relative price psnt=Pst.
Each variety can be produced by a continuum of ￿rms using the country-industry speci￿c
production technology
(17) qsnt = AsntKsnt
where qsnt is output, Asnt total factor productivity, and Ksnt capital.
Capital Allocation with Perfect Financial Development In countries with perfect
￿nancial markets, the return to capital psntAsnt in each industry is equal to the user cost of
capital rt,
(18) psntAsnt = rt:
















which we refer to as the frictionless allocation of capital. Hence, an industry will be allo-
cated more capital if there is an upwards shift in demand and, as long as the elasticity of
substitution between varieties is greater than unity, if there is an increase in total factor pro-
ductivity. Moreover, capital is increasing in industry expenditures as well as prices charged
by the international competition, and decreasing in the user cost of capital.
To go from capital stocks to capital growth we log-di⁄erentiate (19) over time and take
productivity growth ￿lnAsn and demand growth ￿lnBsn to be the sum of a country speci￿c,
an industry speci￿c, and a country-industry speci￿c component, i.e. lnAsn = an + as + asn
and ￿lnBsn = bn+bs+bsn. This implies that frictionless industry capital growth in country








where "sn = ￿asn=(1￿￿)+bsn: ￿lnK￿
s is frictionless capital growth at the industry level due
to global demand and supply shifts, which captures global industry investment opportunities.
￿lnK￿
n re￿ ects country-speci￿c demand and supply shifts.12
Capital Allocation with Frictions Consider a group of countries that experience industry-
speci￿c demand and supply shifts starting from a situation where rates of return are equalized
across industries. To capture that ￿nancial underdevelopment may slow down inter-industry
capital reallocation in response to demand and supply shifts, we use a partial adjustment
model where the speed of adjustment may depend on the country￿ s level of ￿nancial devel-
opment ￿c 2 [0;1],13
(21) ￿lnKsn = ((1 ￿ ￿) + ￿￿n)￿lnK
￿
sn
12Koren and Tenreyro (2007) document global shocks to industry growth using the same international in-
dustry data we will be using for our empirical work in Section 4. They also quantify the relative importance
of global industry shocks, industry shocks that are idiosyncratic to countries, and country-speci￿c shocks.
They ￿nd that country-speci￿c shocks (which will be absorbed by country-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects in our em-
pirical work) are most important. Global industry shocks and industry shocks idiosyncratic to countries are
of a similar order of magnitude.
13The partial adjustment model postulates partial adjustment of a variable to its target and has been
used to model the adjustment of employment (e.g. Nickel, 1986) and capital (e.g. Flannery and Rangan,
2006). In our application, the target is the frictionless capital stock and the partial adjustment model is





: When the speed of adjustment depends on ￿nancial
development, ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿￿n, and countries start from a situation where rates of return are equalized
across sectors, this yields (21).
13with ￿ 2 [0;1]. The scenario of perfect ￿nancial development corresponds to ￿n = 1. In this
case, actual capital growth is identical to frictionless capital growth, ￿lnKsn = ￿lnK￿
sn:
When ￿nancial development is less than perfect, ￿n < 1; industry capital growth will be (1￿
￿)+￿￿n times what it would have been in the frictionless scenario. Hence, when ￿ = 0; inter-
industry capital reallocation is not distorted (slowed down) by ￿nancial underdevelopment.
The closer ￿ to 1, the stronger the distortion implied by ￿nancial underdevelopment.
With su¢ cient data on capital stocks at the country-industry level, we could test whether
￿nancial underdevelopment slows down capital reallocation towards industries with good
investment opportunities using (20) and (21). But there is little international capital data
and almost none at the industry level. On the other hand, there is value added data at
the industry level for a large sample of countries (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Fisman
and Love, 2007): It is therefore worthwhile to examine whether the inter-industry capital
reallocation hypothesis can be tested with value added data. This requires taking the step
from industry capital growth to industry value-added growth. Industry value-added growth
is ￿lnYsn = ￿ln(psnAsnKsn); which can be written as ￿lnYsn = ￿ln(psnAsn) + ￿ln(Ksn)
where ￿ln(psnAsn) is the growth rate of the return to capital in each industry. Using demand
in (16), supply in (17), and the de￿nition of frictionless capital in (19), allows us to rewrite
the growth in the return to capital as
(22) ￿ln(psnAsn) = (1 ￿ ￿)(￿lnK
￿
sn ￿ ￿lnKsn) + ￿lnr:
Hence, the return to capital will be growing faster than the user cost of capital if the industry
gets less than the frictionless amount of capital. Moreover, the wedge between industry
returns and user cost is smaller the greater the elasticity of substitution between varieties.
Using (21) and (22) in ￿lnYsn = ￿ln(psnAsn)+￿ln(Ksn); allows us to obtain industry
value-added growth as a function of frictionless capital growth
(23) ￿lnYsn = ((1 ￿ ￿) + ￿￿n)￿lnK
￿
sn + ￿lnr;
where ￿ = ￿￿. One important implication of (23) is that the e⁄ect of ￿nancial development
on industry value-added growth depends on the product of ￿, the e⁄ect of ￿nancial under-
development on inter-industry capital reallocation, and ￿; which captures the elasticity of
substitution between varieties. Available estimates of ￿ at the level of industry disaggre-
gation we employ in our empirical work are between 0.8 and 0.9, see Feenstra (2004) and
Broda and Weinstein (2006). Hence, ￿ should be quite close to ￿ in practice.14
14Broda and Weinstein (2006), for example, ￿nd an average elasticity of substitution among varieties
during the 1972-1998 period between 6 and 11, depending on the level of disaggregation. These estimates
imply a value of ￿ between 0.8 and 0.9.
143.2 Testing the Capital Reallocation Hypothesis
Making use of (20) allows us to rewrite (23) as
(24) ￿lnYsn = ￿n + [(1 ￿ ￿)￿lnK
￿
s] + ￿￿n [￿lnK
￿
s + "sn] + (1 ￿ ￿)"sn;
where ￿n = ((1 ￿ ￿) + ￿￿n)￿lnK￿
n + ￿lnr depends on country-speci￿c terms only. It is
straightforward to check that (24) is a special case of the empirical framework in Section 2.
Hence, we can apply the estimation approaches discussed there.
(i) US Benchmarking: One way to go from (24) to an equation that can be estimated
with the available data is to use US industry capital growth as a proxy for industry investment
opportunities. This yields the following estimating equation
(25) ￿lnYsn = ￿n + [(1 ￿ ￿)￿lnK
￿
s] + ￿￿n￿lnKsUS + residualsn:
As shown in Section 2.2, estimating (25) with least squares (using industry ￿xed e⁄ects to
capture the term in square brackets) yields a consistent estimate of ￿ if US capital growth
re￿ ects global investment opportunities only: If this is not the case, estimates of ￿ may be
biased upwards or downwards.
(ii) Addressing Benchmarking Bias: Under what conditions can we address the
benchmarking bias following the approach discussed in Section 2.3? Breaking up the term
in the second square bracket in (24), ￿lnK￿
s + "sn; yields




s]￿n + (1 + ￿(￿n ￿ 1))"sn:
The terms in square brackets, (1 ￿ ￿)￿lnK￿
s = ￿s and ￿￿lnK￿
s = ￿s, depend solely on the
industry. Moreover, because global industry investment opportunities are equal to industry
growth in a country with perfect ￿nancial development (￿PF = 1) subject to global shocks
only, it follows that
(27) ￿lnK
￿





n "sn = 0; least-squares estimation of (26) yields consistent estimates of
the industry-speci￿c intercepts ￿s and the industry-speci￿c slopes ￿s. Substituting these
estimates in (27), yields a consistent estimate of global industry investment opportunities
15d ￿lnK￿
s. The interaction between ￿nancial development and estimated global industry in-
vestment opportunities, ￿n d ￿lnK￿
s; can then be used as an instrument for ￿n￿lnKsUS to
obtain a consistent estimate of the interaction e⁄ect in (25), see Wooldridge (2002), Section
6.1.2 for example:
4 Data and Estimation Results
4.1 Data
Our industry value added data come from the Industrial Statistics of the United Nations
Industrial Development Organization, which has data for up to 28 3-digit International Stan-
dard Industrial Classi￿cation manufacturing industries for a maximum of about 80 countries.
Most research using these data focuses on the 1980-1989 period where coverage is highest.
We report results for the 1980-1989 period, with 1607 country-industry observations in 67
countries, and the 1980-1995 period, with 1354 country-industry observations in 58 coun-
tries. Following the literature, our samples do not include countries with data for less than
10 industries and with less than ￿ve years of data for each country-industry. We also follow
the literature in dropping the US because it is the country used for industry benchmarking.
Our US proxy for industry investment opportunities, US industry capital growth, is taken
from the NBER Manufacturing Productivity Database (Bartelsman and Gray, 1996).15 We
use the same database to obtain US industry employment growth. Our main proxy for
￿nancial development is credit provided to the private sector relative to GDP, averaged
over the relevant sample period (for more on this measure of ￿nancial development see
Levine, 2005, and Djankov et al., 2007).16 The data are taken from the World Bank￿ s World
Development Indicators. We also present results for a broader index of total ￿nance, which
sums bank credit and stock market capitalization, and for an index of state ownership of
banks. The Data Appendix lists country samples, variable de￿nitions, and data sources.
Our Web Appendix contains more details on the main industry-level variables, as well as
further empirical results.17
15Wurgler (2000) and Fisman and Love (2007) examine the ￿nancial development interaction with industry
growth opportunities, which they proxy by value-added growth and sales growth respectively. Our focus is on
investment opportunities and we therefore use capital growth as a proxy. Ciccone and Papaioannou (2006)
argue theoretically and empirically that capital growth re￿ ects expectations about the future pro￿tability of
investment better than value-added or sales growth.
16See La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) and Djankov et al. (2007) for empirical evidence on the determinants
of ￿nancial development and private credit in particular.
17For example, empirical results for the 1970-1989 period and the 1970-1995 period. The Web Appendix
is available at www.antoniociccone.eu.
164.2 Main Results
Least-Squares Estimation The baseline estimating equation is
(28) ￿lnYsn = ￿n + ￿s + ￿FDn￿lnKsUS + residualsn;
where FDn denotes ￿nancial development in country n and ￿lnKsUS the US proxy for
investment opportunities in industry s. Our least-squares results for 1980-1989 are in Table
1, Panel A and our results for 1980-1995 in Table 2, Panel A.
Column (1) of Table 1, Panel A shows that the interaction between ￿nancial development
and industry investment opportunities enters positively and is statistically signi￿cant for
1980-1989. Hence, industries with better investment opportunities, as proxied by US capital
growth, grew faster in ￿nancially developed countries. Column (2) controls for the log of
industry value added at the beginning of the sample period. This control is used in the
literature to account for initial di⁄erences in the production structure (e.g. Rajan and
Zingales, 1998; Fisman and Love, 2003; Claessens and Laeven, 2003; Aghion et al. 2010). It
can be seen that initial value added enters signi￿cantly. The coe¢ cient on the interaction
e⁄ect changes little.18 The coe¢ cient implies an annual growth di⁄erential of approximately
1 percentage point between the industry at the 75th percentile and the industry the 25th
percentile of ￿lnKsUS (Plastic Products versus Industrial Chemicals) when they operate in
a country with private credit at the 75th percentile rather than a country close to the 25th
percentile (Chile versus Ecuador). This e⁄ect is large relative to mean and median annual
industry value-added growth in our sample (1:5% and 1:3% respectively).
Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue that ￿nancial development a⁄ects industry growth dif-
ferentially because industries di⁄er in their technological demand for external ￿nance. The
speci￿cation in column (3) adds the Rajan and Zingales interaction between ￿nancial devel-
opment and the external-￿nance dependence of industries, which they proxy by 1 minus the
cash-￿ ow to investment ratio of US industries.19 The interaction between ￿nancial develop-
ment and industry investment opportunities remains positive and statistically signi￿cant.
Industry growth may also be a⁄ected by slow labor reallocation across industries due
to in￿ exible labor market institutions (e.g. Blanchard, 2000; Caballero et al. 2006). The
speci￿cation in column (4) adds an interaction between US-industry employment growth
over the 1980-1989 period and the Botero et al. (2004) index of labor market regulation.
18Since the initial industry value added control does not emerge from our theoretical framework, we
estimated all speci￿cations without it. This did not a⁄ect our main results, see our Web Appendix. We keep
the control to facilitate comparison with the existing literature.
19The original Rajan and Zingales data is for a mix of 3- and 4-digit industries. We use the data of
Klingebiel, Kroszner, and Laeven (2007), which is available for all 3-digit industries in our sample.
17This index re￿ ects the ￿ exibility of employment arrangements, the power of unions, and the
generosity of social bene￿ts. The interaction between ￿nancial development and industry
investment opportunities continues to enter positively and signi￿cantly.20
Column (5) controls jointly for the labor market interaction and the Rajan and Zingales
interaction. The coe¢ cient on the interaction between ￿nancial development and indus-
try investment opportunities remains statistically signi￿cant and in line with our previous
results.
Table 2, Panel A presents the same results for the (smaller) 1980-1995 sample. The
interaction between ￿nancial development and industry investment opportunities is always
positive but the e⁄ect is weaker than in the 1980-1989 sample. Still, the e⁄ect remains
statistically signi￿cant, except in the last column where none of the interactions enters
signi￿cantly.
Instrumental-Variables Estimation We estimate global industry investment opportu-
nities, ￿lnK￿
s in (27), as explained in Section 3.2. We ￿rst estimate ￿lnYsn = ￿n + ￿s +
￿sFDn + residualsn with least squares using data for all countries except the US. Then we
obtain the estimate of global investment opportunities as predicted industry growth in a
country with perfect (in practice, US) ￿nancial development d ￿lnK￿
s = b ￿s + b ￿sFDUS.
First-Stage Estimation Our instrumental-variables approach uses the interaction
between country characteristics and estimated global industry investment opportunities,
xn d ￿lnK￿
s, as an instrument for xn￿lnKsUS: In particular, we instrument FDn￿lnKsUS
in (28) with FDn d ￿lnK￿
s. The corresponding ￿rst stage is a least-squares regression of
FDn￿lnKsUS on country ￿xed e⁄ects, industry ￿xed e⁄ects, and FDn d ￿lnK￿
s:21 This re-
gression yields a point estimate of 0:48 with a t-statistic of 11:06 for the 1980-1989 period,
and a point estimate of 0:49 with a t-statistic of 10:11 for the 1980-1995 period.22
20This remains true when we use sub-components of the labor-market regulation index. The ￿nance
interaction continues to be statistically signi￿cant when we use cross-country (non-US) industry employment
growth data to instrument US employment growth by predicted employment growth in a country with the
US level of labor market regulation. The necessary data is available from the Industrial Statistics of the
United Nations Industrial Development Organization. See the Web Appendix for detailed empirical results.
21The least-squares standard error of the coe¢ cient on FDn d ￿lnK￿
s is valid for testing the null hypothesis
of no e⁄ect (the relevant hypothesis as far as instrument strength is concerned) although the industry-speci￿c
part of the interaction is estimated, see Wooldridge (2002), Section 6.1.1.
22Estimated global industry investment opportunities turn out to explain a signi￿cant part of US industry
capital growth. A least-squares regression of ￿lnKsUS on d ￿lnK￿
s yields a point estimate of 0:48 with a t-
statistic of 3:54 for 1980-1989 (R2 = 0:33), and a point estimate of 0:49 with a t-statistic of 3:33 for 1980-1995
(R2 = 0:34). Hence, an improvement in the global (non-US) investment opportunity of 1 percentage point
translates into an increase in US capital growth of around 0:5 percentage points. See our Web Appendix for
￿gures illustrating the strong link.
18Second-Stage Estimation Table 1, Panel B reports our instrumental-variables (2SLS)
estimates of (28) for the 1980-1989 period. The coe¢ cient on the interaction between ￿nan-
cial development and industry investment opportunities is positive and statistically signif-
icant. This continues to be the case when we control for the initial log level of industry
value added in column (2). Moreover, the interaction e⁄ect changes little when we control
for the Rajan and Zingales (1998) interaction between ￿nancial development and industry
external-￿nance dependence in column (3), the interaction between labor market regulation
and industry employment growth in column (4), or both in column (5). Comparing the
instrumental-variables results in Panel B with the least-squares results in Panel A indicates
that least-squares estimates are attenuated.23
Table 2, Panel B presents the same results for the (smaller) 1980-1995 sample. The
interaction between ￿nancial development and industry investment opportunities is always
positive and statistically signi￿cant. Moreover, and in contrast to our least-squares results,
the e⁄ect tends to be somewhat stronger for 1980-1995 than 1980-1989.
4.3 Additional Evidence and Sensitivity Analysis
Legal Quality, Property Rights, and Human Capital In Tables 3 and 4 we exam-
ine whether the link between ￿nancial development and growth in industries with better
investment opportunities is driven by the e⁄ectiveness of the legal system or property rights
protection, two important aspects of the quality of a country￿ s institutions. We also ex-
amine whether it is human capital rather than ￿nancial development that drives growth
in industries with better investment opportunities. Table 3 reports results for the 1980-
1989 period and Table 4 for 1980-1995. We report least-squares estimates in Panel A and
instrumental-variables (2SLS) estimates in Panel B.
Columns (1)-(2) use Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer￿ s (2007) index of legal system inef-
fectiveness to examine whether industry growth is explained by the interaction between the
legal system and investment opportunities, rather than the interaction of investment oppor-
tunities with ￿nancial development. In column (1) we ￿nd that countries with ine⁄ective
legal systems experience slower growth in industries with better investment opportunities.
Column (2) shows that the ￿nancial development interaction remains a positive and statisti-
cally signi￿cant determinant of growth in industries with better investment opportunities.24
Claessens and Laeven (2003) ￿nd that property rights protection, as proxied by the
23A Hausman test yields that the di⁄erence between the least-squares and instrumental-variables estimate
is statistically signi￿cant at the 0:1% level.
24Our instrumental-variables approach instruments (all) xn￿lnKsUS interactions with xn d ￿lnK￿
s. Hence
all interactions involving industry investment opportunities are treated symmetrically.
19Heritage Foundation￿ s economic freedom index, improves resource allocation across indus-
tries. We therefore examine whether property rights protection also has an e⁄ect on growth
in industries with better investment opportunities. Column (3) shows that countries with
better property rights protection see faster growth in industries with better investment op-
portunities. The speci￿cation in column (4) adds the ￿nancial development interaction with
industry investment opportunities, which enters positively in both sample periods but is
statistically signi￿cant only for the 1980-1995 period. Our instrumental-variables estimates
yield a statistically signi￿cant interaction between industry investment opportunities and
￿nancial development for both sample periods.
Taking advantage of industry growth opportunities may be easier in countries with a well-
educated labor force. Columns (5)-(6) examine this issue by adding an interaction between
industry investment opportunities and country-level average years of schooling in 1980 from
Barro and Lee (2001). Column (5) indicates that countries with higher levels of schooling see
faster growth in industries with better investment opportunities. Column (6) shows that the
￿nancial development interaction remains a positive and statistically signi￿cant determinant
of growth in industries with better investment opportunities. This result holds for both
sample periods, whether we use a least-squares or an instrumental-variables approach.
Column (7) controls jointly for all the factors examined in the previous columns. The
interaction between ￿nancial development and industry investment opportunities remains
positive and statistically signi￿cant in both sample periods and for both estimation methods.
Economic versus Financial Development Table 5 examines whether ￿nancial develop-
ment continues to have an e⁄ect on growth in industries with better investment opportunities
when the country￿ s level of economic development is accounted for. Our measure of economic
development is GDP per capita in 1980 from the Penn World Tables. The presumption is
that GDP per capita summarizes the many factors contributing to the economic development
of a country. Least-squares estimation yields a positive and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect of
the interaction between ￿nancial development and industry investment opportunities. Our
instrumental-variables estimates also yield a statistically signi￿cant interaction between ￿-
nancial development and industry investment opportunities. Hence, ￿nancial development
raises growth in industries with better investment opportunities even when economic devel-
opment is accounted for.
Alternative Measures of Financial Development Table 6 explores alternative mea-
sures of ￿nancial development. Columns (1)-(2) use a very broad measure of ￿nancial devel-
20opment, the sum of bank credit and stock market capitalization relative to GDP. The data
are from the World Bank￿ s World Development Indicators. The interaction between ￿nancial
development and industry investment opportunities enters statistically signi￿cantly, whether
we use least squares or instrumental variables. Columns (3)-(4) report results when we use
an index of government ownership of banks in 1970 to capture ￿nancial (under)development.
The index is taken from La Porta et al. (2002) and refers to 1970.25 Our results show that
the interaction of government ownership with industry investment opportunities enters with
a negative and statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cient. Hence, greater government ownership of
banks lowers growth in industries with better investment opportunities.
5 Summary
Using international industry data to examine the economic e⁄ects of cross-country di⁄erences
in ￿nancial development, institutional quality, and other potential determinants of aggregate
economic activity is attractive for two main reasons. It permits testing whether the impact of,
say, ￿nancial underdevelopment or malfunctioning institutions is strongest in the industries
where it should be theoretically. This helps bringing empirical work closer to the mechanisms
emphasized by economic theory. Moreover, using international industry data also allows
addressing some of the reverse causation and omitted variable issues present in standard
cross-country empirical work.
But the cross-industry cross-country approach is not without potential pitfalls. It re-
quires specifying which industries should be a⁄ected most by ￿nancial underdevelopment,
malfunctioning institutions, etc. The lack of international data on the relevant industry
characteristics has led most of the literature to rely on US data. We have derived the bias
of this approach and shown that proxying the relevant industry characteristics with US data
(or data from another benchmark country) can result in an attenuation bias or an ampli-
￿cation bias. We also described circumstances allowing for an alternative approach that
yields consistent estimates. As an application, we have examined whether ￿nancial develop-
ment facilitates the reallocation of capital from declining industries to industries with good
investment opportunities.
25La Porta et al. (2002) also have data for 1995, which post-dates our sample periods.
21Data Appendix
￿ Countries in the 1980-1989 and 1980-1995 sample: Australia, Austria, Bel-
gium, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Barbados, Canada, Chile, C￿te d￿ Ivoire, Cameroon, China,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Spain, Finland, France, United King-
dom, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Ireland, Iran, Islamic Rep., Iceland, Israel,
Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Rep., Kuwait, Morocco, Sri Lanka,
Malta, Mexico, Mauritius, Malawi, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Senegal, Singapore, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago,
Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zimbabwe. Only 1980-1989: Burundi, Central African
Republic, Denmark, Fiji, Germany, Luxembourg, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea,
South Africa, Swaziland. Only 1980-1995: El Salvador, Tanzania.
Variable De￿nitions and Sources
Country-Industry Speci￿c
￿ Value Added Growth [￿lnYsn]: Annual change of log value added in industry s in
country n. Source: United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Industrial
Statistics, 2005.
￿ Initial Conditions: Natural logarithm of value added in the beginning of the sample
(1980). Source: United Nations Industrial Development Organization Statistics, 2005.
Industry-Speci￿c
￿ US External Finance Dependence: Industry reliance on external sources of ￿nanc-
ing, de￿ned as the industry-level median of the ratio of capital expenditure minus cash
￿ ow to capital expenditure for U.S. ￿rms averaged over the period 1980-1989. Source:
Klingebiel, Kroszner, Laeven (2007); constructed as in Rajan and Zingales (1998) at
the 3-digit ISIC. Original source: COMPUSTAT.
￿ US Employment Growth: Annual change of log employment in the US over the
1980-1989 or 1980-1995 period. Source: NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database
(Bartelsman and Gray, 1996).
￿ US Capital Growth [￿lnKsUS]: Annual change of log real capital stock in industry s
in the US over the 1980-1989 or 1980-1995 period. Source: NBER-CES Manufacturing
Industry Database (Bartelsman and Gray, 1996).
22Country-Speci￿c
￿ Financial Development [FDn]: Domestic credit to the private sector relative to
GDP. Domestic credit refers to ￿nancial resources provided through loans, purchases
of non-equity securities, trade credits, and other accounts receivable that establish a
claim for repayment. We use the natural logarithm of the average of the variable over
the period 1980-1989. Source: World Bank World Development Indicators Database
(2005).
￿ Total ￿nance: Alternative index of ￿nancial development that incorporates both pri-
vate credit and stock market capitalization. Total ￿nance is the sum of bank credit to
GDP and stock market capitalization to GDP. We assume that unavailable stock mar-
ket capitalization data implies inexistent stock markets. We use the natural logarithm
of the average of the variable over the period 1980-1989. Source: World Bank World
Development Indicators Database (2005).
￿ State Bank Ownership: Government ownership of banks in 1970. Source: La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002).
￿ Economic Development: Natural logarithm of real per capita GDP in 1980. Source:
Penn World Tables 5.6.
￿ Property Rights: Index of property rights protection ranging from 1 to 5, with higher
values indicating better protection. The index is calculated as in Claessens and Laeven
(2003) and refers to the 1995-1999 period (no earlier data is available). Source: The
Index of Economic Freedom (The Heritage Foundation), 2005 edition.
￿ Labor Market Regulation: Labor-market regulation index based on the existence
of alternative employment contracts, the cost of increasing hours, the cost of ￿ring,
and the formality of dismissal procedures. The variable ranges from zero to a hundred
where higher values indicate a greater extent of labor market regulation. Source:
Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2004).
￿ Legal Ine¢ ciency: Index of the ine⁄ectiveness of the legal/court system, based on
the number of days to resolve a payment dispute through courts. Source: Djankov,
McLiesh and Shleifer (2007).
￿ Schooling: Average years of schooling of the population aged 25 and over in 1980.
Source: Barro and Lee (2001).
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26Figure 1: Illustrating the LS Amplification Bias
Figure 1 illustrates the amplification bias of the standard cross-industry cross-country estimator when x takes only two 
values. The slope of the dashed red line is the true effect and the slope of the solid green line the least-squares estimate. 
The green line is based on equation (13). See the Sub-Section entitled "Amplification Bias" in Section 2.2.1 for an 
explanation.Figure 2: Monte Carlo Simulation 
LS Benchmarking Bias
Figure 2 plots the bias of the standard cross-industry cross-country estimator in a Monte Carlo simulation (on the 
vertical axis) for different values of σ (on the horizontal axis) in (14). The dashed red line is the average least-squares 
(LS) estimate from the Monte Carlo simulation. The solid blue line is the asymptotic bias implied by equation (15). 
The true parameter value is 0.5. See the Sub-Section entitled "Amplification and Attenuation Bias in a Simple 
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Predicted LS estimate LS estimate
True coefficient value (0.5)Figure 3: Monte Carlo Simulation
Comparing the LS and the IV Estimate
Figure 3 plots the bias of the standard cross-industry cross-country estimator and our alternative estimator in a Monte 
Carlo simulation (on the vertical axis) for different values of σ (on the horizontal axis) in (14). The dashed red line is 
the average least-squares (LS) estimate from the Monte Carlo simulation. The solid blue line is the average 












0 .05 .1 .15 .2
LS estimate IV estimate
True coefficient value (0.5)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Financial Development X  0.3183*** 0.3733*** 0.2809** 0.4454*** 0.3888***
Investment Opportunities  (0.1035)  (0.0994)  (0.1198)  (0.0958) (0.1176)
Financial Development X  0.0178** 0.0111778
External Finance Dependence  (0.0084) (0.0076)
Labor Market Regulation  -0.0932 -0.1166346
X  Employment Growth  (0.2939) (0.2932)
Initial Conditions -0.0190*** -0.0196*** -0.0112*** -0.0114***
 (0.0031)  (0.0032)  (0.0024) (0.0025)
adj. R-squared 0.284 0.337 0.340 0.409 0.410
Financial Development X  1.0610*** 1.0908*** 1.1169*** 1.0623*** 1.1445***
Investment Opportunities  (0.2746)  (0.2555) (0.3024)  (0.1842) (0.2258)
Financial Development X  -0.0022 -0.0072
External Finance Dependence (0.0094) (0.0090)
Labor Market Regulation  -0.2155 -0.2094
X  Employment Growth  (0.3012) (0.3021)
Initial Conditions -0.0196*** -0.0196*** -0.0120*** -0.0118***
 (0.0032) (0.0032)  (0.0025) (0.0025)
Countries 67 67 67 49 49
Observations 1607 1607 1607 1268 1268
Country Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 1: Financial Development, Investment Opportunities, and Industry Growth
Panel A: LS Estimates (1980-1989)
Panel B: 2SLS Estimates (1980-1989)
The dependent variable is the annual growth rate of value added at the country-industry level for the period 1980-1989. The 
Financial Development X Investment Opportunities interaction is the product of industry-level investment opportunities 
(capital growth in the US) and country-level financial development. The Financial Development X External Finance 
Dependence interaction is the product of industry-level reliance on external finance (in the US) and country-level financial 
development.  The Labor Market Regulation X Employment Growth interaction is the product of industry-level employment 
reallocation (employment growth in the US) and a country-level index of labor market regulation. The specifications in 
columns (2)-(5) include the initial (1980) log of value added at the country-industry level. 
Panel A reports LS estimates using the benchmarking approach, which uses US industry characteristics (US capital growth) as 
a proxy for the relevant industry characteristics (industry investment opportunities). Panel B reports 2SLS estimates, where the 
interaction term between country-level financial development and industry investment opportunities (US capital growth) is 
instrumented with an interaction between financial development and estimated global (non-US) industry investment 
opportunities. All specifications include country fixed-effects and industry fixed-effects (coefficients not reported). 
Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% level respectively. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data 
sources(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Financial Development X  0.2752** 0.3696*** 0.2481* 0.2995** 0.2287
Investment Opportunities  (0.1178)  (0.1144)  (0.1383)  (0.1177)  (0.1447)
Financial Development X  0.0152* 0.0092
External Finance Dependence  (0.0090)  (0.0092)
Labor Market Regulation  0.0775 0.0480
X  Employment Growth  (0.4067)  (0.4146)
Initial Conditions -0.0168*** -0.0172*** -0.0149*** -0.0153***
 (0.0027)  (0.0028)  (0.0022)  (0.0022)
adj. R-squared 0.432 0.480 0.482 0.527 0.528
Financial Development X  1.1893*** 1.2448*** 1.4956*** 0.9755*** 1.1793***
Investment Opportunities  (0.3377)  (0.3078)  (0.4368)  (0.2395)  (0.3639)
Financial Development X  -0.0204 -0.0176
External Finance Dependence  (0.0143)  (0.0144)
Labor Market Regulation  0.0149 0.0645
X  Employment Growth  (0.4328)  (0.4501)
Initial Conditions -0.0179*** -0.0174*** -0.0160*** -0.0153***
 (0.0029)  (0.0029)  (0.0023)  (0.0023)
Countries 58 58 58 45 45
Observations 1354 1354 1354 1076 1076
Country Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 2: Financial Development, Investment Opportunities, and Industry Growth
Panel A: LS Estimates (1980-1995)
Panel B: 2SLS Estimates (1980-1995)
The dependent variable is the annual growth rate of value added at the country-industry level for the period 1980-1995. The 
Financial Development X Investment Opportunities interaction is the product of industry-level investment opportunities (capital 
growth in the US) and country-level financial development. The Financial Development X External Finance Dependence 
interaction is the product of industry-level reliance on external finance (in the US) and country-level financial development.  The 
Labor Market Regulation X Employment Growth interaction is the product of industry-level employment reallocation (employment 
growth in the US) and a country-level index of labor market regulation. The specifications in columns (2)-(5) include the initial 
(1980) log of value added at the country-industry level.
Panel A reports LS estimates using the benchmarking approach, which uses US industry characteristics (US capital growth) as a 
proxy for the relevant industry characteristics (industry investment opportunities). Panel B reports 2SLS estimates, where the 
interaction between country-level financial development and industry investment opportunities (US capital growth) is instrumented 
with an interaction between financial development and estimated global (non-US) industry investment opportunities. All 
specifications include country fixed-effects and industry fixed-effects (coefficients not reported). Heteroskedasticity-adjusted 
standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95%, 
and 90% level respectively. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Financial Development X  0.3520*** 0.3098*** 0.3771*** 0.3544***
Investment Opportunities  (0.1125)  (0.1009)  (0.0992)  (0.1064)
Legal Inefficiency X  -0.2640*** -0.1085                 -0.0435
Investment Opportunities  (0.0783)  (0.0839)                  (0.0892)
              
Property Rights X  0.2421*** 0.1485**                 0.1571*  
Investment Opportunities  (0.0656)  (0.0668)                  (0.0911)
              
Schooling X  0.0668*** 0.0323 -0.0013
Investment Opportunities  (0.0237)  (0.0228)  (0.0296)
adj. R-squared 0.350 0.355 0.344 0.347 0.340 0.345 0.377
Financial Development X  1.0411*** 0.9161*** 1.1854*** 1.0828***
Investment Opportunities  (0.2817)  (0.2240)  (0.2375)  (0.2488)
Legal Inefficiency X  -0.6206*** -0.1617 -0.0484
Investment Opportunities  (0.1577)  (0.1596)  (0.2003)
              
Property Rights X  0.5074*** 0.2274                 0.3029
Investment Opportunities  (0.1919)  (0.1780)                  (0.2501)
              
Schooling X  0.1546**  0.0482 -0.0411
Investment Opportunities  (0.0605)  (0.0532)  (0.0619)
Initial Conditions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries 58 58 65 65 63 63 54
Observations 1453 1453 1572 1572 1552 1552 1399
Country Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: 2SLS Estimates (1980-1989)
Table 3: Financial Development, Investment Opportunities, and Industry Growth 
Alternative Adjustment Channels
Panel A: LS Estimates (1980-1989)
The dependent variable is the annual growth rate of value added at the country-industry level for the period 1980-1989. The set of 
explanatory variables includes interaction terms between industry-level investment opportunities (capital growth in the US) with 
country-level measures capturing legal inefficiency, property rights protection, schooling, and financial development. All 
specifications include the initial (1980) log of value added at the country-industry level.
Panel A reports LS estimates using the benchmarking approach, which uses US industry characteristics (US capital growth) as a 
proxy for the relevant industry characteristics (industry investment opportunities). Panel B reports 2SLS estimates, where the 
interactions between country-level characteristics (legal inefficiency, property rights protection, schooling, and financial 
development) and industry investment opportunities (US capital growth) are instrumented with interactions between estimated 
global (non-US) industry investment opportunities and the respective country-level characteristic. All specifications include 
country fixed-effects and industry fixed-effects (coefficients not reported). Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are reported 
in parentheses below the coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% level respectively. 
The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Financial Development X  0.2710* 0.1816 0.4453*** 0.3315***
Investment Opportunities  (0.1387)  (0.1264)  (0.1092)  (0.1237)
Legal Inefficiency X  -0.3694*** -0.2445** 0.0003
Investment Opportunities  (0.0868)  (0.1088)  (0.1075)
              
Property Rights X  0.3475*** 0.2864***                 0.3272***
Investment Opportunities  (0.0706)  (0.0757)                  (0.0987)
              
Schooling X  0.0943*** 0.045 -0.0353
Investment Opportunities  (0.0303)  (0.0315)  (0.0384)
adj. R-squared 0.486 0.488 0.486 0.487 0.457 0.464 0.474
Financial Development X  1.1294*** 0.8591*** 1.0036*** 0.9247***
Investment Opportunities  (0.3609)  (0.2757)  (0.2482)  (0.2846)
Legal Inefficiency X  -0.8070*** -0.2706 -0.0112
Investment Opportunities  (0.1747)  (0.2107)  (0.2218)
Property Rights X  0.8412*** 0.5455***                 0.2974
Investment Opportunities  (0.2153)  (0.1944)                  (0.2378)
Schooling X  0.3308*** 0.2159*** 0.1268
Investment Opportunities  (0.0865)  (0.0757)  (0.0821)
Initial Conditions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries 52 52 57 57 55 55 49
Observations 1227 1227 1331 1331 1312 1312 1185
Country Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 4: Financial Development, Investment Opportunities, and Industry Growth
Alternative Adjustment Channels
Panel A: LS Estimates (1980-1995)
Panel B: 2SLS Estimates (1980-1995)
The dependent variable is the annual growth rate of value added at the country-industry level for the period 1980-1995. The set 
of explanatory variables includes interaction terms between industry-level investment opportunities (capital growth in the US) 
with country-level measures capturing legal inefficiency, property rights protection, schooling, and financial development. All 
specifications include the initial (1980) log of value added at the country-industry level.
Panel A reports LS estimates using the benchmarking approach, which uses US industry characteristics (US capital growth) as a 
proxy for the relevant industry characteristics (industry investment opportunities). Panel B reports 2SLS estimates, where the 
interactions between country-level characteristics (legal inefficiency, property rights protection, schooling, and financial 
development) and industry investment opportunities (US capital growth) are instrumented with interactions between estimated 
global (non-US) industry investment opportunities and the respective country-level characteristic. All specifications include 
country fixed-effects and industry fixed-effects (coefficients not reported). Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are 
reported in parentheses below the coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% level 
respectively. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources.1980-1989 1980-1995
(1) (2)
Financial Development X Investment Opportunities 0.2879*** 0.2690**
 (0.1028)  (0.1255)
Economic Development X  Investment Opportunities 0.1118 0.1237
 (0.0755)  (0.0977)
adj. R-squared 0.338 0.481
Financial Development X Investment Opportunities 1.3823*** 0.9125**
 (0.3665)  (0.4298)
Economic Development X  Investment Opportunities -0.3807** -0.1924
 (0.1645)  (0.1935)
Initial Conditions Yes Yes
Countries 67 58
Observations 1607 1354
Country Fixed-Effects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed-Effects Yes Yes
Panel A: LS Estimates
Table 5: Financial Development, Investment Opportunities, and Industry Growth 
Accounting for Economic Development
Panel B: 2SLS Estimates
The dependent variable is the annual growth rate of value added at the country-industry level for the period 1980-1989 or 
the period 1980-1995. The Financial Development X Investment Opportunities interaction is the product of industry-
level investment opportunities (capital growth in the US) and country-level financial development. The Economic 
Development X Investment Opportunities interaction is the product of industry-level investment opportunities (capital 
growth in the US) and country-level GDP per capita.  Both specifications include the initial (1980) log of value added at 
the country-industry level.
Panel A reports LS estimates using the benchmarking approach, which uses US industry characteristics (US capital 
growth) as a proxy for the relevant industry characteristics (industry investment opportunities). Panel B reports 2SLS 
estimates, where the interaction between country-level economic development and industry investment opportunities (US 
capital growth) and the interaction between country-level financial development and industry investment opportunities 
are instrumented with interactions between the respective country-level characteristic and estimated global (non-US) 
industry investment opportunities. All specifications include country fixed-effects and industry fixed-effects (coefficients 
not reported). Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. ***, **, and 
* indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% level respectively. The Data Appendix gives detailed 
variable definitions and data sources.1980-1989 1980-1995 1980-1989 1980-1995
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Finance X  0.2806*** 0.4031***
Investment Opportunities  (0.0877)  (0.1049)
State Bank Ownership X  -0.7351*** -0.7822***
Investment Opportunities  (0.1726)  (0.1985)
adj. R-squared 0.335 0.482 0.392 0.492
Total Finance X  0.7106*** 0.5527***
Investment Opportunities  (0.1796)  (0.1829)
State Bank Ownership X  -2.2197*** -1.9871***
Investment Opportunities  (0.4313)  (0.4424)
Initial Conditions Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries 67 58 56 53
Observations 1607 1354 1452 1278
Country Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel A: LS Estimates 
Panel B: 2SLS Estimates 
Table 6: Financial Development, Investment Opportunities, and Industry Growth
Alternative Financial Development Measures
The dependent variable is the annual growth rate of value added at the country-industry level for the period 1980-
1989 or the period 1980-1995. The Total Finance X Investment Opportunities interaction is the product of industry-
level investment opportunities (capital growth in the US) and country-level private credit plus stock market 
capitalization relative to GDP. The State Bank Ownership X Investment Opportunities interaction is the product of 
industry-level investment opportunities (capital growth in the US) and country-level government ownership of banks. 
All specifications include the initial (1980) log of value added at the country-industry level.
Panel A reports LS estimates using the benchmarking approach, which uses US industry characteristics (US capital 
growth) as a proxy for the relevant industry characteristics (industry investment opportunities). Panel B reports 2SLS 
estimates, where the interaction between country-level financial development and industry investment opportunities 
(US capital growth) is instrumented with an interaction between the country-level measure of financial development 
and estimated global (non-US) industry investment opportunities. All specifications include country fixed-effects and 
industry fixed-effects (coefficients not reported). Heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors are reported in 
parentheses below the coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% level 
respectively. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources.